In this paper, we analyze successive oligopolies where downstream firms share the same decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional literature in which output firms use a constant returns technology. It is shown that when firms use a decreasing returns technology, (i) the profit of a downstream firm can decrease when the upstream market is more competitive; (ii) the input price does not tend to the corresponding marginal cost when the number of firms in both markets tends to infinite; and (iii) double marginalization is lower. Finally, the effects of mergers are revisited to highlight the role played by the technology of output firms.
Introduction
The literature devoted to successive oligopolies is traditionally based on a simplifying assumption concerning the link between the two successive markets: the firms producing the final output -downstream firms -are assumed to have the same CobbDouglas linear technology f (z) = z, with z denoting the amount of the single input used in the production process. Nonetheless, this simplifying assumption concerns the crucial feature of industries composed of a chain of markets. Indeed, the link between these markets is the input demand of downstream firms to input suppliers, which depends on the downstream technology 1 . Consequently, the homogeneous or linear transformation of the input to output, used in the existing literature, is suitable only for industries in which the output production is simply the distribution of the good to the final consumers. However, such an assumption rules out most other industries.
In this paper, we first consider a more general framework of successive oligopolies that allows isolating the role played by the downstream technology. To illustrate the properties of such a framework, we then introduce the assumption that downstream firms share a decreasing returns technology. To allow for comparisons with the previous literature, we assume that the downstream firms use a Cobb-Douglas production function. Accordingly, the technology used in our illustration belongs to the same class of production functions as the technology used in the literature. Our concern is whether the main conclusions reached under the constant returns assumption still hold when this decreasing returns technology is substituted to the linear one. To ease the comparison, as in the previous literature, we keep the assumption of a linear output final demand.
The main results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, contrary to the linear case, the profit of a downstream firm, under the decreasing returns technology, may well be decreasing with the number of upstream firms. Second, in contrast with the linear case, simultaneously increasing the number of firms in both markets (upstream and downstream), does not let the input price converge to the competitive price, namely to the input marginal cost. Furthermore, we show that double marginalization is less severe under decreasing returns than it is under constant returns. The analysis of double marginalization is important because double marginalization can be indirectly considered as a measure of the surplus appropriation resulting from the combination of market power in successive oligopolies. It is well known that the double marginalization problem can be alleviated or even avoided through the use of more sophisticated contracts (Tirole, (1988) ). Nevertheless, in industries such as the cable TV industry in the US, the common business practice is to charge a price per subscriber so that, in such industries, linear pricing is still applied and double marginalization remains an issue. Finally, we revisit the analysis of mergers, computing a comparative statics of equilibrium prices. We also investigate the role of market size on the profitability of mergers, capturing the differences brought by the use of different downstream technologies.
Notably, successive markets have served as a basis for analyzing how vertical integration of firms can affect competition (among others Perry, (1989) , Greenhut and Ohta, (1979) , Salop and Scheffman, (1987), Salinger, (1988) , Gaudet and Va n Long, (1996) , and Riordan, (1998) ). These works constitutes one of the two approaches to vertical integration : the market approach 2 . This paper draws the attention of scholars on the following. With successive Cournot oligopolies, the profitability and size of the effects of mergers, vertical and horizontal ones, strongly depend on the "simplifying" assumption of the downstream technology.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is presented. In sections 3 and 4, according to the technology used in the downstream market, we analyze the effects of number of firms in profits, the asymptotic properties of input and output prices, and the degree of double marginalization. Finally, in section 5, we study the effects of downstream technology on mergers. Section 6 concludes.
The model
Consider two successive markets, the downstream and upstream market, with n downstream firms indexed by i,i = 1,...n, in the first producing and selling the final good, and m upstream firms indexed by j, j = 1,...m, in the second, producing and selling the input. The n downstream firms face a differentiable and decreasing demand function p(Q), p (Q) < 0, in the downstream market, with Q denoting the aggregate quantity of the final good. These firms share the same technology f (z i ),i = 1,...n, to produce the final good, with z i denoting the quantity of the sole input used in the production process, where f (z i ) is invertible and at least twice differentiable and f (z i ) > 0, f (z i )≤0. The m upstream firms each produce the input, sharing the same technology with total cost C(z j ), j = 1,..,m, where C (z j )≥ 0.
We assume that this situation gives rise to two games. The players in the upstream game are the upstream firms with input strategies s j , j = 1...m, whereas the players in the downstream game are the n downstream firms with final good strategies q i , i = 1...n. The two markets are linked to each other as follows. In the downstream game, firms strategically select the final good levels q i which determine their individual input demand z i (ω) via the production function f (.), given the input price ω. Consequently, the downstream firms while behaving strategically in the final good market are assumed to be price takers in the input market. Faced with the input demand schedule Σ n i=1 z i (ω) resulting from aggregating individual demands, firms in the upstream game select non-cooperatively the quantities of input s j they offer for sale. The input market price ω at which upstream firms evaluate their profits is assumed to clear the input market, namely
Hence, the industry equilibrium is defined as the situation in which both the downstream and upstream markets exhibit Cournot equilibria, and where the quantity of input demanded at equilibrium in the first market exactly balances the quantity supplied in the second. Namely, Definition An industry equilibrium is a (m + n)-tuple vector (q * 1 (ω * ),... ,q * n (ω * );s * 1 (ω * ),...,s * m (ω * )) and an input price ω * such that (i) (q * 1 (ω * ),... ,q * n (ω * )) is a Nash equilibrium in the downstream game (ii) (s * 1 (ω * ),...,s * m (ω * )) is a Nash equilibrium in the upstream one, and
The industry equilibrium can be obtained as follows. Given an input price ω and the downstream technology q i = f (z i ), the payoff Π i in the downstream game for the i th firm with the vector of strategies
Given these payoffs and a price ω in the input market, the best reply, q i (q −i ;ω) of firm i in the downstream game, is obtained as a solution (whenever it exists) to the problem Max
At a symmetric equilibrium, the solution of the FOCs yields the vector of output quantities selected in the downstream game q * i (ω) = q * (ω), i = 1...n. Given the downstream technology, we can obtain the corresponding vector of input quantities,
Denote by ε p (nz * ) the elasticity of output demand in the downstream market. Accordingly, using the rule of inverse elasticity for oligopolies, we obtain0
which implicitly defines the Nash equilibrium (q * 1 (ω),...,q * n (ω)) in the downstream game (whenever it exists) 3 , where because of symmetry q * i (ω) = q * (ω), i = 1...n. And consequently, (2) defines the vector of input quantities demanded by downstream firms (z * 1 (ω),...,z * n (ω)), where again z * i (ω) = z * (ω), i = 1...n. In the upstream game, firms select their selling strategies s j , j = 1,..,m. Assuming a Nash equilibrium in the downstream game, they face a total inverse input demand equal to ω(nz * ) that we obtain aggregating (z * 1 (ω),...,z * n (ω)) at a symmetric equilibrium in the downstream market. Using the input market clearing condition (1), namely nz * = Σ m j=1 s j , the inverse input demand can be written as ω(Σ m j=1 s j ). Accordingly, the payoff function
whenever it is defined for all admissible values of ω. The upstream firms play Cournot and select the equilibrium input amounts (s * 1 (ω * ),...,s * m (ω * )), where because of symmetry s * j (ω) = s * (ω), j = 1...m. Thus, the market solution of a symmetric industry equilibrium obtains as {q * (n,m);s * (n,m); p * (n,m);ω * (n,m)}.
It is worth noting that our industry equilibria are meaningful in various specifications of the output demand function p(Q) and technology f (z). Furthermore, closed solutions can be identified in some particular specifications, assuming for instance a linear demand function combined with a linear or quadratic increasing marginal cost. These specifications will be considered extensively in section (3) and (4).
Properties of industry equilibria
In this section, we address some properties of the industry equilibria that concern the number of firms in each market and the degree of double marginalization. The aim is to show how these properties depend on the technology of downstream firms.
Number of firms and profits
Here, we analyze the role played by the degree of competition in the input market on the profits of downstream firms. Assume there is an increase in the number of firms m in the input market that increases competition in this market. Consider the inverse input demand in expression (2), which at the symmetric industry equilibrium defines the output price p * (n,m) as
.
It follows that an increase of m has two effects on the profit of a downstream firm: a direct effect on the cost side (transmitted through the input price) and an indirect one on the revenue side (transmitted through the output price) 4 . Accordingly, whether the profit of the downstream firm increases or decreases with m depends on the extent of the direct and indirect effect. When f (z i ) = z i ∀i , the expression (3) becomes a function of only the price elasticity of demand and the input price. It follows that the change in the profit of a downstream firm due to an increase of m reduces to the traditional problem of the effect on profits of a decrease in production cost for Cournot competitors. Conventional wisdom says that profits of Cournot competitors increase as costs decrease 5 . Therefore, with constant returns technology in the output market, the markup p * (n,m) − ω * (n,m) of a downstream firm only increases as the upstream market becomes more competitive. On the contrary, when the technology used by the downstream firm does not show constant returns, then f (.) can boost the decrease of revenues, making it larger, in absolute value, than the decrease of the cost side. Consequently, an increase of competitiveness in the upstream market may not lead to an increase in the profit of output firms. In fact, we will see that in the case f (z) = √ z, paradoxically, an increase of competition in the upstream market may lead to a decrease of the profit of downstream firms. 4 Note that the indirect effect is the strategic effect that takes place in Cournot competition. The increase in the output production of one firm, as a result of lower costs (↓ ω), makes the output price of all firms decrease; therefore, an individual firm's action affects all firms (Kurz, (1985) ).
5 Assumning that we are out of the paradox explained in Seade (1985) .
Size of double marginalization
Here, we address the effect of the technology of the producers of the final good on the degree of double marginalization. Double marginalization can be defined as the sum of the markup exercised by the upstream firms, ω * −C (z * ), and the markup applied by the downstream firms, p * (n,m) − ω * (n,m), which yields p * (n,m) − C (z * (n,m)). Therefore, given C (z * (n,m)), to compare the degree of double marginalization, we are led to compare the output price corresponding to different technologies of the downstream firms. Given the equilibrium output price in (3), similarly to the argument in (2.1.1), we learn that the difference between the output prices corresponding to different technologies depends on the size of f (.). Such an effect is absent with a linear technology. More specifically, the role played by the downstream technology on double marginalization will be investigated using the equilibrium prices derived in sections (3) and (4).
Asymptotic properties of input and output prices
Another property that we investigate is the effect of free entry of new firms in each market. To do so, we use a replication procedure introduced by Debreu and Scarf (1963) in the framework of a pure exchange economy: we replicate a number of time, say τ,τ = 1,2,..., the basic economy described above. In the τ-th replica, downstream market demand is given by τ(1−Q) and there are τn downstream and τm upstream firms. Notice that, in the τ th -replica, the prices at which demand is equal to supply both in the downstream and upstream markets does not depend on the number τ, but depends only on m and n. Indeed, at the symmetric equilibrium in the upstream market, the input quantities supplied by the m upstream firms have to be multiplied by τ in the τ th -replica; a similar process is required for the quantities demanded by the n downstream firms in the downstream market. Consequently, the equality of supply and demand in the upstream market eliminates the τ− factor in each side of the equality. A similar reasoning applies for the symmetric price equilibrium in the downstream market. It follows that the study of the behavior of the upstream and downstream markets when the number of replications increases is equivalent to the study of the limit equilibrium prices and quantities obtained in equilibrium, where the number of firms is τn and τm, instead of n and m, in each market, respectively. Using equation (2), we see that when the number of firms in each market tends to infinity, the term 1 − 1 n|ε p (n,m)| tends to one, as ε p (n,m) tends to infinity. Therefore, when τ → ∞, the input price boils down to
Accordingly, when the marginal productivity is constant and equal to one, the output price and the input price tend to the same amount at the limit, whereas, when the marginal productivity is not constant with z but changes with m and n, the convergence of ω(z * ) depends on lim τ→∞ f (z * (τn,τm)) p( f (z * (τn,τm))) . In the following two sections, we check the above properties of industry equilibria for a linear downstream technology that corresponds to the case considered in the previous literature and a case of a decreasing returns technology.
Industry equilibria under constant returns
In this section, we shortly recall the example of successive oligopolies considered in the literature, as in Salinger (1988) or Gaudet and Va n Long (1996) . In the downstream market, firms face the linear output demand p(Q) = 1 − Q and share the same technology f (z) given by
Firms in the upstream market produce the input with a constant marginal cost equal to β, with 0≤β < 1 6 . Accordingly, applying the mechanism explained in the above section to the symmetric equilibrium of the game, we obtain s * (n,m) =
Consequently, substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities z * i of input bought by each downstream firm, we get z * (n,m) =
. Accordingly, the resulting output price p * (n,m) in the downstream market is
The profit Π * (n,m) of a downstream firm at equilibrium in the downstream game writes as
Number of firms and profits
It is easy to see that
> 0. Therefore, as we showed in section (2.1.1) with a constant returns technology in the downstream market, an increase in the competition in the upstream market undoubtedly leads to an increase in the profit of output suppliers. In fact, given ∂q * (n,m) ∂m > 0, using the equilibrium prices, we can check that the decrease of the input price, in absolute value, is larger than the decrease of the output price :
2 and
2 n (n+1) ; as β < 1 we have
Asymptotic properties of input and output prices
Using the equilibrium prices, we compute Therefore, as expected from the analysis in section (2.1.3), under constant returns, when the number of firms in each market both tend to infinity at the same speed, the equilibrium output price converges to its marginal cost: the input prices, which in turn tends to its marginal cost. This is the well-known law of convergence of Cournot equilibria toward competitive equilibria applied in successive Cournot oligopolies.
Industry equilibria under decreasing returns
In this section, we turn our attention to a different type of technology from the previous literature. To illustrate the properties of industry equilibria in section (2) for the sake of obtaining a closed solution, we derive the industry equilibrium when downstream firms use a decreasing returns technology of the Cobb-Douglas type
whereas output demand is again p(Q) = 1 − Q. Making use of the technology, the profits Π i of the i th downstream firm obtains as
From the FOCs, we obtain the symmetric solution of outpur quantities q * (ω), from where we obtain the input quantity demanded by each firm in the downstream market, z * (ω)
Therefore, we can identify the total demand for input at the symmetric solution of the first game, using (6), namely nz * (ω) = n (n+2ω+1) 2 . Then, using the input marketclearing condition, the equality
has to be satisfied for any vector of strategies (s 1, ..., s j ,..s m ) in the input market. Accordingly, the equality
must hold for any vector of strategies in the input market. Substituting (7) into the profit function of an upstream firm, Γ j (s j ,s −j ), we have
Notice that the profit function Γ j (s j ,s −j ) is concave in s j , j = 1,...m, so we can use the first order necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize the equilibrium. At the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the upstream game, we obtain
Therefore, the profit Γ * (n,m) of an upstream firm at the symmetric equilibrium of the upstream game obtains as
Finally, the equilibrium price ω * (n,m) in the input market writes as ω * (n,m) = n + 1 + 4mβ 2(2m − 1) .
Substituting this equilibrium price into the equilibrium quantities q * of output selected by the downstream firms we get q * (n,m) = 2m−1 2m(2β+n+1) so that, given the technology, the equilibrium input quantity used by downstream firms writes as
2 . Therefore, the resulting output price p * (m,n) in the downstream market obtains as
The profit Π * i (m,n) of a downstream firm at equilibrium in the corresponding game is thus equal to
Notice that Π * i > 0, -a requirement needed to guarantee the survival of firms in the downstream market.
Having identified the closed solution of the model, we can now easily check the properties of the industry equilibria in the decreasing returns technology example.
Number of firms and profits
We start from the relationship between the number of firms in the upstream market and the profit of the downstream firms.
Proposition 1 In spite of fiercer competition, the profit of downstream firms decreases with the number of firms in the upstream market if m > n−1 n−3+2β and n > 3 − 2β.
Proof. see Appendix 1.
As we saw in section (2.1.1), an increase in the number of input suppliers has two effects: a direct effect on the cost side of the profit and another indirect effect on the revenue side of it. Consider the profit function of the downstream firm: p * (n,m) z * (n,m) − ω * (n,m)z * (n,m). The effect on revenues is now
2 m 3 , and the cost-side effect is
2 m 3 . Therefore, comparing these effects we learn that with decreasing returns, the effect on the revenue side can, for a set of m and n, overcome the effect on the cost side, leading to a decrease in the downstream firms' profits 7 . The final effect on the downstream profit can be negative because the effect on the revenue incorporates the non-linear marginal productivity of the input
. Such an effect on the revenue side depends on m and n. Proposition 1 tells exactly the minimum threshold on m, such that, if the upstream market becomes more competitive (m > n−1 n−3+2β ), the reduction in input costs is less important than the strategic effect happening in the downstream market.
An analogous result can be found in Seade (1985) who shows that under Cournot oligopoly, it is not necessarily true that a decrease in production costs leads to an increase in profits. Seade (1985) uses conditions in elasticity in the market demand function to identify when decreasing costs can increase profits. In our case, this phenomenon is obtained in a chain of markets and, consequently, the condition bears also on the type of technology of the downstream firms, as well on the relative number of firms in the markets.
Asymptotic properties of input and output prices
We have seen in section (2.1.3) that when downstream firms use a constant returns technology, both of these prices asymptotically tend to the corresponding marginal costs. Surprisingly enough, this property fails to hold in our case of a decreasing returns technology! Contrary to intuition, we show in the next proposition that with a Cobb -Douglass decreasing returns technology, the input price may well not converge to its marginal cost Proposition 2 If the technology used by the downstream firms is f (z i ) = √ z i ,i = 1...n, and if the number of replicas of the basic economy tends to infinity, then the sequence of equilibrium input prices does not converge to upstream firms' marginal cost.
The new thinking brought by our analysis is that in successive markets, the marginal cost for the firms who produce the final good is not fixed, as in Cournot 7 Indeed, we obtain m+n−mn+2mβ 2(n+2β+1) (1838). Here, the output marginal cost is determined by the input price at the industry equilibrium, which is a consequence of the input and output demand at the industry equilibrium. Under the decreasing returns technology f (z) = √ z, the equilibrium quantity produced by each downstream firm tends to zero when the number of replicas tends to infinity. Accordingly, the marginal product of input tends itself to infinity, rendering impossible the equality of supply and demand in the upstream market. The volume of input demand can be matched with the volume of input supply only by dampening demand with a price that remains strictly higher than the marginal cost of producing the input, whatever the number of replicas. By contrast, in the linear case, marginal productivity remains constant whatever large the number of replicas, which prevents a similar phenomenon to arise.
Note that Proposition 2 considers free entry with the same speed of firms in both markets. This replication method of the basic economy affects market power in each market differently. Therefore, the input demand and the input supply are affected differently by the entry of new firms. As a consequence, the input price, which clears the input market, does not necessarily lead to the price equal to the technological marginal cost to produce the input. Nevertheless, this input price does not preclude the limit economy to be in a Pareto optimal state simultaneously in both markets.
By contrast, if the economy would be replicated at different speeds in the downstream and upstream markets, this discrepancy between marginal cost and input price may disappear. In fact, when the upstream market is replicated infinitely faster than the downstream one, this discrepancy totally vanishes at the limit. For instance, when the downstream market is replicated at speed τ while the upstream market is replicated at speed τ 2 , the limit input price is equal to the marginal cost β. In other words, the power of upstream firms should be diluted much faster than the downstream firms' one to force the competitive outcome 8 !
Double marginalization
Finally, to compare double marginalization, we compare output prices under the two technologies. From direct comparison of equilibrium output prices corresponding to the two downstream technologies, we obtain Proposition 3 Double marginalization is lower when downstream firms use the decreasing returns technology f (z) = √ z than when they use a constant returns technology f (z) = z.
As discussed in section 2.1.2, with a linear downstream technology, the term 1 f (z * (n,m)) has no effect on the extent of double marginalization, but it does when the technology has a non-constant marginal productivity. With f (z) = √ z, 1 f (z * (n,m)) < 1, leading to the result claimed in the above proposition.
The role of downstream technology on mergers
In this section, we introduce mergers in succesive oligopolies with the downstream technology of decreasing returns used in the above section. The specific technology allows to obtain the closed solution of the industry equilibria with mergers thus it allows to analyze the effect of the degree mergers on equilibrium prices through a comparative statics analysis. It also possible to investigate the relationship between the market size and mergers profitability.
Assume that k downstream firms i, i = 1,...,k, and h upstream firms j, j = 1,...,h, collude and maximize joint profits (notice that all firms, h + k, merge in one entity). We assume that k < n and h < m 9 . After this merger, we move from an initial situation comprising n + m firms globally to a new one, with n − k + 1 firms in the downstream market and m − h in the upstream one. Indeed, the integrated entity now internalizes output production by using the input provided by the h upstream firms belonging to the new entity. This general formulation covers as particular cases mergers including either only downstream firms, or only upstream ones, which correspond to the usual case of horizontal merging of firms. These collusive agreements reduce the total number of decision units operating in the downstream and upstream markets and, thus, the corresponding number of oligopolists in each of them (see Salant et al, (1983) ). Collusive outcomes are the Cournot equilibria corresponding to this reduced number of oligopolists in each market.
The payoff of the integrated firm indexed with I is given by
where q I denotes the quantity of output produced by the entity. For the sake of tractability, we assume at this point that the input marginal cost β is zero.
As for the downstream firms i,i = I, not belonging to the integrated entity, they have as payoffs 10
Following the solution of the game in the benchmark model, under symmetry among the unintegrated firms in the downstream as well as among those in the upstream market, the industry equilibrium obtains as s * (k,h) = 1 4
, and
The closed solution of the industry equilibrium with mergers when the technology used by downstream firms is f (z i ) = z i , i = 1...n is detailed in Appendix 2.
Comparative statics of equilibrium prices
In this section, we analyze the effects of the extent of mergers on equilibrium prices, as the downstream firms use a linear or a decreasing returns Cobb-Douglas technology. Horizontal mergers reduce the number of firms operating in the market leading to an increase of the price of the good. Only when firms are not symmetric, efficiencies generated through these mergers can enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, which may result in lower prices. In our setup of symmetric firms this beneficial effect is absent. Whereas, vertical mergers determines manifold effects on input and output prices even in the case of symmetric firms. On the one hand, because of the elimination of double marginalization, the merged entity has incentives to increase the output quantity produced. This is the well-known efficiency effect, which decreases the output price to consumers. On the other hand, the entity may find it profitable to shrink its production to increase the output price. As a consequence, the effect of vertical integration in the input demand ex post integration is ambiguous. Secondly, unintegrated final good producers react to the shift in their residual output demand, further changing the market input demand. Finally, the merged firm may withdraw from the input market, increasing the market power of unintegrated input firms, who, as a consequence, may reduce their input supply. This is the so-called foreclosure effect. Therefore, depending on the extent of the decrease of input demand and input supply, the input price may increase or decrease. Accordingly, the decrease of output price as a result of the efficiency effect, may be further accentuated or offset depending on whether the input price increases or decreases. The extent of such effects ultimately determines the profitability of mergers.
It is important to note that all these effects take place under a constant and/or decreasing returns technology in the downstream market. It is the extent of such effects that depends on the type of the technology used by the downstream firms. In fact, as we learned from proposition 3, output technology determines the size of double marginalization, which determines the efficiency effect. Moreover, the technology to produce the output good affects input demand: thus, technology affects the size of the shifts of input demand and input supply of the unintegrated firms through the input marginal productivity. It follows that a general analysis using the model in section (2) would require a one-to-one mapping of each type of technology with the extent of these effects. Thus, only an analysis case by case can provide an answer of the role of output technology on the effect of mergers 11 . Thanks to the explicit closed solutions obtained in the case of a linear cost and in the case of a quadratic cost function, we are now in a position to make the desired comparison.
We start with the equilibrium input price 12 . With decreasing returns technology, we find that
differently, with constant returns, we have
∂ω * (k,h) ∂k = 0. As explained at the beginning of this section, the change of the input price is the consequence of the shift of input demand and input supply. The increase in the number of input suppliers participating in the merger, h, reduces the number of independent input suppliers. Such a reduction increases the market power of the latters, leading to an increase in the input price. At the same time, in the case of decreasing returns considered, the entity decreases its output as h increases, leading to a decrease of the total output produced in equilibrium 13 . We learn that in this case, the decrease in input demand is greater than the decrease in input supply. By contrast, with constant marginal returns, the quantity produced by the entity at the ex post integration equilibrium increases leading to a decrease of the output produced by the unintegrated downstream firms. Consequently, these last firms decrease their input demand whereas the unintegrated input suppliers gain market power in the upstream market because of higher concentration in this market. Thus, the unintegrated input suppliers decrease their input supply. In this case the decrease of input 11 For a reduced-form analysis of endogenous vertical agreements with no specification of output demand but nevertheless with downstream firms using a linear technology, see Buehler and Schmutzler (2005) .
12 Calculations of the comparative statics analysis are relegated to Appendix 3. 13 Indeed ∂q * I ∂h < 0 and
demand is lower than the decrease of input supply, leading to a final increase in the input price. Similarly, the increase in the number of output suppliers participating in the merger, k, decreases the input demand of unintegrated downstream firms, as the market share of the unintegrated firms decreases. This decreases the input price. With our decreasing returns technology, the higher k leads to an increase in the output produced by the entity, which yields an increase in its input demand. Due to such increase, the input supplied also increases leading to a final decrease in the input price.
As far as it concerns the equilibrium output price, we find
whereas, with constant returns
> 0. Therefore, with decreasing returns, a higher number of input suppliers in the merger leads to a lower price for final consumers, because the increase of output production of the entity offsets the higher market power of unintegrated upstream firms. With constant returns, the increase in the output production of the entity is not large enough to evacuate the higher market power of unintegrated input suppliers. The reason again stands in the different marginal productivity of the merged entity.
Finally, a higher number of output firms that participate in the merger leads to a higher output price. This is the well-known effect of horizontal mergers in the final goods market (Salant et al, 1983) : a higher degree of horizontal mergers (↑ k) decreases the number of operating firms in the downstream market, leading to an increase in the output price. This effect is the same with both technologies.
Profitability and market size The relationship between the number of profitable mergers and the size of the upstream and downstream markets can be analyzed using the replica procedure as in section (2.1.3). This is analogous to Elberfeld (2002) and Dufeu (2004) , who, using a particular setup of successive oligopolies, are able to define numerically the percentage of profitable mergers, replicating the basic economy.
We can compute the limit analysis of the profitability of mergers and the size of the markets by analyzing the asymptotic value of the profit of the merged entity Π * I , and that of the unintegrated firms, Π * i and Γ * j . Computing such limits (see Appendix 4), we find that when the size of the upstream market is fixed at m firms, whereas firms freely enter the downstream market, mergers are profitable if
that is 1 16(k+1) > 1 16 , which is never true ! Hence, when firms freely enter the downstream market increasing the relative size of the output market infinitely, but the number of input suppliers is fixed, at the limit economy, no merger is profitable.
It is interesting to check this result in the case in which downstream firms use a constant returns technology. In this case, we obtain (see Appendix 4)
2(m−h+1) and ω * − β = 1 2(m−h+1) , respectively. Moreover, the input demand faced by the unintegrated upstream firms increases as the number of firms that enter the output market n increases. Therefore, because of the markup and the input demand, the upstream firms have no interest in merging.
On the contrary, with decreasing returns, the price of the input is not constant with n. In fact, in this case, the input price increases with n. Thus, because the marginal cost to produce the input is fixed, the markup of the unintegrated input suppliers increases as the input prices increases with n. Again, this provides a disincentive against the formation of mergers, but the mechanism here is different from that with constant returns.
Consider now the case when the upstream market is also replicated and the number of firms tends to infinity. The profitability of mergers at the limit under decreasing returns is given by Thus, when the market size of both the input and output markets increases infinitely, the profitability of mergers with decreasing returns disappears. At the limit economy, no merger occurs. Differently, with constant returns, when both markets are infinitely replicated, regardless of the size of the merger h + k, the profit of the entity tends to the profit of the unintegrated firms. Thus, at the limit economy, with constant returns, firms are indifferent between merging or operating separately. We can summarize our findings as follows:
Result 1: When downstream firms use a Cobb-Douglas decreasing returns technology, the higher the number of downstream firms in the merger, the higher the output price and the lower the input price, whereas the higher the number of input suppliers in the merger, the lower the input and output price.
Result 2: When firms freely enter the downstream market increasing the relative size of the output market infinitely, at the limit economy no merger is profitable, because the markup of unintegrated input supliers is increasing with the number of downstream firms.
Result 3: When the market size of both the input and output markets increases infinitely, the profitability of mergers with decreasing returns disappears.
Conclusion
In this paper, we highlight the role played by the downstream technology in successive oligopolies. We propose a general analysis of successive markets isolating the role of the marginal productivity of the input. Then, we detail an example of successive oligopolies where the downstream firms share the same decreasing technology of the Cobb-Douglas type. We stress the differences between the conclusions obtained under this assumption and those resulting from the traditional literature, which uses a constant returns technology. We find that when firms use a CobbDouglas decreasing returns technology rather than a linear one: (i) the profit of a downstream firm can decrease as the upstream market becomes more competitive; (ii) the input price does not tend to the corresponding marginal cost when the number of firms in both markets tends to infinity; and finally (iii) double marginalization is lower. We, finally, develop an analysis of mergers highlighting the differences brought of the use of different technologies. These discrepancies between market behavior corresponding to alternative technological conditions reveal how fragile are the theoretical conclusions obtained when analyzing the interplay of firms' strategies in successive markets only using a linear technology in the downstream market, as it is done so far in the literature.
